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Abstract—Formal-verification techniques, such as model
checking, are becoming popular in hardware design. SAT-based
model checking techniques, such as IC3/PDR, have gained a
significant success in the hardware industry. In this paper, we
present a new framework for SAT-based safety model checking,
named Complementary Approximate Reachability (CAR). CAR is
based on standard reachability analysis, but instead of maintain-
ing a single sequence of reachable-state sets, CAR maintains two
sequences of over- and under- approximate reachable-state sets,
checking safety and unsafety at the same time. To construct the
two sequences, CAR uses standard Boolean-reasoning algorithms,
based on satisfiability solving, one to find a satisfying cube of
a satisfiable Boolean formula, and one to provide a minimal
unsatisfiable core of an unsatisfiable Boolean formula. We applied
CAR to 548 hardware model-checking instances, and compared
its performance with IC3/PDR. Our results show that CAR is
able to solve 42 instances that cannot be solved by IC3/PDR.
When evaluated against a portfolio that includes IC3/PDR and
other approaches, CAR is able to solve 21 instances that the
other approaches cannot solve. We conclude that CAR should
be considered as a valuable member of any algorithmic portfolio
for safety model checking.
I. INTRODUCTION
Model checking is a fundamental methodology in formal
verification and has received more and more concern in
the hardware design community [1], [2]. Given a system
model M and a property P , model checking answers the
question whether P holds for M . When P is a linear-time
property, this means that we check that all behaviors of
M satisfy P , otherwise a violating behavior is returned as
a counterexample. In the recent hardware model checking
competition (HWMCC) [3], many benchmarks are collected
from the hardware industry. Those benchmarks are modeled
by the aiger format [4], in which the hardware circuit and
properties (normally the outputs of the circuit) to be verified
are both included. For safety checking, it answers the question
whether the property (output) can be violated by feeding the
circuit an arbitrary (finite) sequence of inputs. In this paper,
we focus on the topic of safety model checking.
Popular hardware model checking techniques include
Bounded Model Checking (BMC) [5], Interpolation Model
Checking (IMC) [6] and IC3/PDR [7], [8]. BMC reduces the
search to a sequence of SAT calls, each of which corresponds
to the checking in a certain step. The satisfiability of one of
such SAT calls proves the violation of the model to the given
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property. IMC combines the use of Craig Interpolation as an
abstraction technique with the use of BMC as a search tech-
nique. IC3/PDR starts with an over-approximation, gradually
then refined to be more and more precise [7], [8]. All of the
three approaches have proven to be highly scalable, and are
today parts of the algorithmic portfolio of modern symbolic
model checkers, e.g. ABC [9].
We present here a new SAT-based model checking
framework, named Complementary Approximate Reachability
(CAR), which is motivated both by classical symbolic reach-
ability analysis and by IC3/PDR as an abstraction-refinement
technique. While standard reachability analysis maintains a
single sequence of reachable-state sets, CAR maintains two
sequences of over- and under-approximate reachable-state
sets, checking safety and unsafety at the same time. While
IC3/PDR also checks safety and unsafety at the same time,
CAR does this more directly by keeping an over-approximate
sequence for safety checking, and an under-approximate se-
quence for unsafety checking. To compute these sequences,
CAR utilizes off-the-shelf Boolean-reasoning techniques for
computing Minimal Unsat Core (MUC) [10], in order to
refine the over-approximate sequence, and Minimal Satisfying
Cube (i.e., partial assignment) [11], in order to extend the
under-approximate sequences. In contrast, IC3/PDR uses a
specialized technique, called generalization, to compute Mini-
mal Inductive Clauses (MIC) [7]. Thus, IC3/PDR computes
relatively-inductive clauses to refine the over- approximate
state sequence, while CAR does not. Because of this differ-
ence, CAR and IC3/PDR are complementary, with CAR faster
on some problem instances where refining by non-relatively-
inductive clauses is better, and IC3/PDR faster on others where
refining by relatively-inductive clauses is better.
To evaluate the performance of CAR, we benchmarked it
on 548 problem instances from the 2015 Hardware Model-
Checking Competition, and compared the results with IC3/
PDR. The results show that while the performance of CAR
does not dominate the performance of IC3/PDR, CAR comple-
ments IC3/PDR and is able to solve 42 instances that IC3/PDR
cannot solve. When evaluated against a portfolio that includes
IC3/PDR, BMC, and IMC, CAR is able to solve 21 instances
that the other approaches cannot solve. It is well known that
there is no “best” algorithm in model checking; different
algorithms perform differently on different problem instances
[12], and a state-of-the-art tool must implement a portfolio of
different algorithms, cf. [9]. Our empirical results also support
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the conclusion that CAR is an important contribution to the
algorithmic portfolio of symbolic model checking.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces
preliminaries, while Section III describes the framework of
CAR. Section IV introduces experimental results, and Section
V discusses and concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Boolean Transition System, Safety Verification and Reach-
ability Analysis
A Boolean transition system Sys is a tuple (V, I, T ), where
V is a set of Boolean variables, and every state s of the system
is in 2V , the set of truth assignments to V . I is a Boolean
formula representing the set of initial states. Let V ′ be the
set of primed variables (a new copy) corresponding to the
variables of V , then T is a Boolean formula over V ∪ V ′,
denoting the transition relation of the system. Formally, for
two states s1, s2 ∈ 2V , s2 is a successor state of s1, denoted
as (s1, s2) ∈ T , iff s1∪ s′2 |= T , where s′2 is a primed version
of s2.
A path (of length k) in Sys is a finite state sequence
s1, s2, . . . , sk, where each (si, si+1)(1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1) is in
T . We use the notation s1 → s2 → . . .→ sk to denote a path
from s1 to sk. We say that a state t is reachable from a state
s, or that s reaches t, if there is a path from s to t. Moreover,
we say t is reachable from s in i steps (resp., within i steps)
if there is a path from s to t of length i (resp., of length at
most i).
Let X ⊆ 2V be a set of states in Sys. We define
R(X) = {s′|(s, s′) ∈ T where s ∈ X}, i.e., R(X) is
the set of successors of states in X . Conversely, we define
R−1(X) = {s|(s, s′) ∈ T where s′ ∈ X}, i.e., R−1(X) is
the set of predecessors of states in X . Recursively, we define
R0(X) = X and Ri(X) = R(Ri−1(X)) for i > 0. The
notations of R−i(X) is defined analogously.
Given a Boolean transition system Sys = (V, I, T ) and a
safety property P , which is a Boolean formula over V , the
system is called safe if P holds in all reachable states of Sys,
and otherwise it is called unsafe. The safety checking asks
whether Sys is safe. For unsafe systems, we want to find a
path from an initial state to some state s that violates P , i.e.,
s ∈ ¬P . We call such state reachable to ¬P a bad state, and
the path from I to ¬P a counterexample.
In symbolic model checking (SMC), safety checking is
performed via symbolic reachability analysis. From the set
I of initial states, we compute the set of reachable states by
computing Ri(I) for increasing values of i. We can compute
the set of states that can reach states in ¬P , by computing
(R−1)i(¬P ) for increasing values of i. The first approach is
called forward search, while the second one is called backward
search. The formal definition of these two approaches are
shown in the table below.
Forward Backward
Basic: F0 = I B0 = ¬P
Induction: Fi+1 = R(Fi) Bi+1 = R−1(Bi)
Terminate: Fi+1 ⊆
⋃
0≤j≤i Fj Bi+1 ⊆
⋃
0≤j≤iBj
Check: Fi ∩ ¬P 6= ∅ Bi ∩ I 6= ∅
For forward search, the state set Fi is the set of states
that are reachable from I in i steps. This set is computed
by iteratively applying R. To find a counterexample, forward
search checks at every step whether one of the bad states has
been reached, i.e., whether Fi∩¬P 6= ∅. If a counterexample is
not found, the search will terminate when Fi+1 ⊆
⋃
0≤j≤i Fj .
For backward search, the set Bi is the set of states that
can reach ¬P in i steps. The workflow of backward search
is analogous to that of forward search. Note that forward
checking of Sys = (V, I, T ) with respect to P is equivalent
to backward checking of Sys−1 = (V,¬P, T−1) with respect
to ¬I , where T−1 is simply T , with primed and unprimed
variables exchanged.
B. Notations
Each variable a ∈ V is called an atom. A literal l is an atom
a or a negated atom ¬a. A conjunction of a set of literals, i.e.,
l1∧l2∧. . .∧lk, for k ≥ 1, is called a cube. Dually, a disjunction
of a set of literals, i.e., l1 ∨ l2 ∨ . . . ∨ lk, for k ≥ 1, is called
a clause. Obviously, the negation of a cube is a clause, and
vice versa. Let C be a set of cubes (resp., clauses), we define
the Boolean formula f(C) =
∨
c∈C c (resp., f(C) =
∧
c∈C c).
For simplicity, we use C to represent f(C) when it appears
in a Boolean formula; for example, the formulas φ ∧ C and
φ ∨ C, abbreviate φ ∧ f(C) and φ ∨ f(C).
A cube (/clause) c can be treated as a set of literals, a
Boolean formula, or a set of states, depending on the context
it is used. If c appears in a Boolean formula, for example,
c ⇒ φ, it is treated as a Boolean formula. If we say a set c1
is a subset of c2, then we treat c1 and c2 as literal sets. If we
say a state st is in c, then we treat c as a set of states.
We use s(x)/s′(x′) to denote the current/primed version
of the state s. Similarly, we use φ(x)/φ′(x′) to denote the
current/primed version of a Boolean formula φ. For the
transition formula T , we use the notation T (x, x′) to highlight
that it contains both current and primed variables. Consider a
Boolean formula φ whose alphabet is V ∪ V ′ and is in the
conjunctive normal form (CNF). If φ is satisfiable, there is
a full assignment A ∈ 2V ∪V ′ such that A |= φ. Moreover,
there is a partial assignment Ap ⊆ A such that for every
full assignment A′ ⊇ Ap it holds that A′ |= φ. In the
following, we use the notation pa(φ) to represent a partial
assignment of φ, and use pa(φ)|x to represent the subset of
pa(φ) achieved by projecting variables only to V . On the other
hand, if φ is unsatisfiable, there is a Minimal Unsat Core
(MUC) C ⊆ φ (here φ is treated as a set of clauses) such
that C is unsatisfiable and every C ′ ⊂ C is satisfiable. In
the following, we use the notation muc(φ) to represent such
a MUC of φ, and use muc(φ)|c′ to represent the subset of
muc(φ) achieved by projecting clauses only to c′. Since c′ is
a cube, muc(φ)|c′ is also a cube.
III. THE FRAMEWORK OF CAR
We present here a variant of standard reachability check-
ing, in which the set of maintained states is allowed to be
approximate. The new approach is named Complementary
Approximate Reachability, abbreviated as CAR. As in standard
reachability analysis, CAR also enables both forward and
backward search. In the following, we introduce the forward
approach in detail; the backward approach can be derived
symmetrically.
A. Approximate State Sequences
In standard forward search, described in Section II, each
Fi is a set of states that are reachable from I in i steps.
To compute elements in Fi+1, previous SAT-based symbolic-
model-checking approaches consider the formula φ = Fi(x)∧
T (x, x′), and use partial-assignment techniques to obtain all
states in Fi+1 from φ (by projecting to the prime part of the
assignments). Since the set of reachable states is computed
accurately, maintaining a sequence of sets of reachable states
from I enables to check both safety and unsafety. However in
Forward CAR, two sequences of sets of reachable states are
necessary to maintain: 1). (F0, F1, . . .) is a sequence of over-
approximate state sets, which are supersets of reachable states
from I . 2) (B0, B1, . . .) is a sequence of under-approximate
state sets, which are subsets of reachable states to ¬P . Under
the approximation, the first sequence is only sufficient to check
safety, and the second one is then required to check unsafety.
The two state sequences are formally defined as follows.
Definition 1: For a Boolean system Sys and the
safety property P , the over-approximate state sequences
(F0, F1, . . . , Fi) (i ≥ 0), which is abbreviated as F -
sequence, and the under-approximate state sequence
(B0, B1, . . . , Bk)(k ≥ 0), which is abbreviated as B-
sequence, are finite sequences of state sets such that:
Basic F0 = I B0 = ¬P
Constraint Fj ⊆ P (0 ≤ j) –
Inductive Fj+1 ⊇ R(Fj)(j ≥ 0) Bj+1 ⊆ R−1(Bj)(j ≥ 0)
For each Fi(i ≥ 0), we call it a frame. We also define the
notation S(F ) =
⋃
0≤j≤i Fj is the set of states in the F -
sequence, and S(B) =
⋃
0≤j≤k Bj is the set of states in the
B-sequence.
Note that the F - and B-sequence are not required to have
the same length. Intuitively, each Fi+1 is an over-approximate
set of states that are reachable from Fi in one step, and Bi+1 is
an under-approximate set of states that are reachable to Bi in
one step. As we mentioned in Section II, we overload notation
and consider Fi to represent (1) a set of states, (2) a set of
clauses and (3) a Boolean formula in CNF. Analogously, we
consider Bi to be (1) a set of states, (2) a set of cubes and
(3) a Boolean formula in DNF.
The following theorem shows that, the safety checking is
preserved even if Fi(i ≥ 0) becomes over-approximate.
Theorem 1 (Safety Checking): A system Sys is safe for P
iff there is i ≥ 0 and an F -sequence (F0, F1, . . . , Fi, Fi+1)
such that Fi+1 ⊆
⋃
0≤j≤i Fj .
Proof: (⇐) Let S = ⋃0≤j≤i Fj . According to Definition
1, if Fi+1 ⊆ S is true, R(S) = R(
∨
0≤j≤i−1 Fj) ∪ R(Fi) ⊆
((S ∪ Fi+1) = S). So S contains all reachable states from I .
Also we know P ⊇ Fi(0 ≤ i ≤ k), so P ⊇ S holds. That
means S ∩¬P is empty, and thus all reachable states from I ,
which are included in S, are not in ¬P . So the system Sys
is safe for P .
(⇒) Assume the system Sys is safe for P , then all reachable
states from I are in P . Let S ⊆ P be the set of reachable
states from I . Now let F0 = I, F1 = S and F2 = S, and
according to Definition 1 we know that δ = (F0, F1, F2) is an
F -sequence satisfying F2 ⊆ F0 ∪ F1.
Theorem 1 is insufficient for unsafety checking, as Fi+1 ⊆⋃
0≤j≤i Fj has to prove false for every i ≥ 0. On the other
hand, the unsafety checking condition ∃i · Fi ∩ ¬P 6= ∅
in the standard forward reachability is not correct when Fi
becomes over-approximate. Our solution is to benefit from the
information stored in the B-sequence.
Theorem 2 (Unsafety Checking): For a system Sys and the
safety property P , Sys is unsafe for P iff there is i ≥ 0 and
a B-sequence (B0, B1, . . . , Bi) such that I ∩Bi 6= ∅.
Proof: (⇐) If I ∩Bi 6= ∅ and according to Definition 1,
we can find a path ρ = s0 → s1 → . . . si in Sys such that
s0 ∈ I ∩ Bi and sj ∈ Bi−j for 1 ≤ j ≤ i. Hence we have
that si ∈ B0 = ¬P , which means ρ is a counterexample. So
Sys is unsafe for P .
(⇒) If Sys is unsafe for P , there is a path ρ from I to
¬P . Let the length of ρ be n+ 1, and state j(0 ≤ j ≤ n) on
the path is labeled as ρ[j]. Now we construct the B-sequence
(B0, B1, . . . , Bi) in the following way: Let i = n and Bj =
{ρ[i−j]} for 0 ≤ j ≤ i. So Bi = {ρ[0]} satisfying Bi∩I 6= ∅
(because ρ[0] ∈ I).
Besides, since CAR maintains two different sequences,
exploring the relationship between them can help to establish
the framework. The following property shows that, the states
stored in F - and B- sequences are unreachable when the
system Sys is safe for the property P .
Property 1: For a system Sys and the safety property P ,
Sys is safe for P iff there is an F -sequence such that S(F )∩
R−1(S(B)) = ∅ for every B-sequence.
Proof: (⇒) Theorem 1 shows if Sys is safe for P there is
an F -sequence and n ≥ 0 such that Fn+1 ⊆
⋃
0≤j≤n Fj . Let
S =
⋃
0≤j≤n Fj . We have proven that R(S) ⊆ S, i.e. S is the
upper bound of S(F ). So S(F ) =
⋃
0≤j≤i Fj = S for all i ≥
n. On the other hand, since we consider arbitrary B-sequence,
we set S(B) to its upper bound: the set of all reachable states
to ¬P . In this situation, R−1(S(B)) = S(B). Now if S(F )∩
R−1(S(B)) 6= ∅, assume that s ∈ S(F )∩R−1(S(B)). So s is
reachable to ¬P . Assume s is reachable to t ∈ ¬P and from
the definition of S(F ) we know t ∈ S(F ) too. However, this
is a contradiction, because S(F )∩¬P is empty based on the
constraint S(F ) ⊆ P . So S(F ) ∩R−1(S(B)) = ∅ is true.
(⇐) Since both S(F ) and S(B) have an upper bound, we
can set them to their upper bounds. That is, set S(F ) to contain
all reachable states from I , and S(B) to contain all reachable
states to ¬P . Because R−1(S(B)) has the same upper bound
with S(B), S(F ) ∩ R−1(S(B)) = ∅ indicates that I is not
reachable to ¬P . So Sys is safe for P .
Property 1 suggests a direction that how we can refine the
F -sequence and update the B-sequence. That is to try to make
the states in these two sequences unreachable. More details are
shown in the next section.
We have established the Forward CAR framework, and
presented the theoretical guarantee for both safety and unsafety
checking. Note that symmetrically, Backward CAR performs
the same framework on Sys−1 = (V,¬P, T−1) with respect
to ¬I , where T−1 is simply T with primed and unprimed
variables exchanged.
B. The Framework
Unlike the standard forward reachability, which computes
all states in Fi+1 from the single formula Fi(x) ∧ T (x, x′),
Forward CAR computes elements of Fi+1 from different SAT
calls with different inputs. Each SAT call gets as input a
formula of the form Fi(x)∧T (x, x′)∧ c′(x′), where the cube
c is in some Bj and c′ is its primed version. If the formula is
satisfiable, we are able to find a new state which is in Bj+1;
otherwise we prove that c∩R(Fi) = ∅, which indicates Fi+1
can be refined by adding the clause ¬c. The following lemma
shows the main idea of computing new reachable states to ¬P
and new clauses to refine Fi.
Lemma 1: Let (F0, F1, . . .) be an F -sequence, (B0, B1, . . .)
be a B-sequence, cube c1 ∈ Bj(j ≥ 0) and the formula φ be
Fi(x) ∧ T (x, x′) ∧ c1′(x′)(0 ≤ i):
1) If φ is satisfiable, there is a cube c2 such that every state
t ∈ c2 is a predecessor of some state s in c1 and t ∈ Fi.
By updating Bj+1 = Bj+1 ∪ {c2}, the sequence is still
a B-sequence.
2) If φ is unsatisfiable, c1 ∩ R(Fi) = ∅. Moreover, there is
a cube c2 such that c1 ⇒ c2 and c2 ∩ R(Fi) = ∅. By
updating Fi+1 = Fi+1 ∪ {¬c2}, the sequence is still an
F -sequence.
Proof:
1) Since φ is satisfiable, there exists a partial assignment Ap,
which is a set of literals, of φ. Now by projecting Ap to
the part only contains current variables, i.e. Ap|x, we set
c2 = A
p|x. Let t ∈ c2 and s ∈ c1 are two states. From
the definition of partial assignment, we know that t(x)∪
s′(x′) is a full assignment of φ. So t is a predecessor of
s. Moreover, since Fi consists of only current variables,
t(x) ∪ s′(x′) |= Fi(x) implies t |= Fi. So t ∈ Fi is true.
Before updating Bj+1, we know that Bj+1 ⊆ R−1(Bj).
And since c2 ⊆ R−1(c1) and c1 ⊆ Bj , so c2 ⊆ R−1(Bj).
Hence, Bj+1∪{c2} ⊆ R−1(Bj). That is, Bj+1 is under-
approximate. Finally, for every other Bk(1 ≤ (k 6= j +
1)), Bk ⊆ R−1(Bk−1) is true. From Definition 1, the
sequence is still a B-sequence.
2) From the definition R(Fi) = {s|(t, s) ∈ T and t ∈ Fi},
we know for every state s ∈ R(Fi) there is a state t ∈ Fi
such that t(x) ∪ s′(x′) |= Fi(x) ∧ T (x, x′). If there is a
state s ∈ c1 such that s ∈ R(Fi), we know that there
is t ∈ Fi such that t(x) ∪ s′(x′) is an assignment of
φ, making φ satisfiable. But this is a contradiction. So
c1∩R(Fi) = ∅. Moreover, since φ is unsatisfiable, there is
a cube c2 such that c1 ⇒ c2 and Fi(x)∧T (x, x′)∧c2′(x′)
is still unsatisfiable. So c2∩R(Fi) = ∅ is also true, which
implies that ¬c2 ⊇ R(Fi), i.e. states represented by ¬c2
includes all those in R(Fi). So Fi+1 ∪ {¬c2} ⊇ R(Fi)
is true, which means Fi+1 is still over-approximate. For
every other Fk(1 ≤ (k 6= i + 1)), they remains over-
approximate. As a result, we prove that the sequence is
still an F -sequence.
In the lemma above, Item 1 suggests to add a set of states
rather than a single one to the B-sequence, and similarly Item
2 suggests to refine the F -sequence by blocking a set of states
rather than a single one. In both situations, it will speed up the
computation. These two kinds of heuristics can be achieved by
partial-assignment and MUC techniques. That is, we can set
c2 = pa(φ)|x in Item 1, and c2 = muc(φ)|c1′ in Item 2. Now,
we provide a general framework of CAR, which is shown in
Table I.
The motivation of the computation are simply twofold:
1) Enlarge the lengths of the F - and B-sequences step by
step (controlled by i in the framework); 2) For each i,
update both sequences until either the unsafety is detected
(Step 3(b)ii) or S(F ) ∩ R−1(B(F )) = ∅. From Property 1,
S(F ) ∩ R−1(S(B)) is a necessary condition to prove safety
(in Step 3c). In Step 3(b)i, we choose the minimal index
because CAR aims to find a counterexample, if exists, as
soon as possible. The F - and B-sequence are not extended
synchronously: In each i, the F -sequence is extended only
once (in Step 3a), while the B-sequence is extended more
than once (in Step 3(b)iv and 3(b)vi). In Step 3c, the constraint
Fj ⊆
⋃
0≤m≤j−1 Fm can be checked by SAT solvers with the
input formula (Fj ∧
∧
0≤m≤j−1 ¬Fm). The constraint holds
iff the formula is unsatisfiable. S(F ) and S(B) are updated
by default when the F - and B-sequence are updated. The
correctness and termination of the framework are guaranteed
by the following theorem.
Theorem 3: Given a system Sys and a safety property P ,
the framework terminates with a correct result.
We first show that the assertions in the framework are
always true, and then prove the while loop in Step 3b can
finally terminate.
Lemma 2: The assertions in Step 3(b)vi and 3(b)vii are
always true.
Proof: We first prove the assertion in Step 3(b)vi is true.
From Step 3(b)i we know that Fj−1 ∩ R−1(S(B)) = ∅, so
(c2 ⊆ Fj−1)∩R−1(S(B)) = ∅ is also true. Thus the assertion
c2 6⊆ R−1(S(B)) is true. For the assertion in Step 3(b)vii,
first from Step 3(b)iii we know that c1 ∩ Fj 6= ∅, so (c2 ⊇
c1)∩Fj 6= ∅ is also true. Thus the assertion ¬c2 6⊇ Fj is true.
Informally speaking, Lemma 2 guarantees that adding c2 to
Bk+1 increases strictly the states in R−1(S(B)) (recall that
each Bi is in DNF), while adding ¬c2 to Fj decreases strictly
the states in Fj (Fj is in CNF). The assertions help to prove
TABLE I: The Framework of Forward CAR
1) Initially, set B0 = ¬P, F0 = I;
2) If F0 ∩B0 6= ∅ or R(F0) ∩B0 6= ∅, return unsafe with counterexample;
3) For i ≥ 1,
a) Set Fi := P ;
b) while S(F ) ∩R−1(S(B)) 6= ∅
i) Let j be the minimal index such that Fj ∩R−1(Bk) 6= ∅ for some k ≥ 0;
ii) If j = 0, return unsafe with counterexample;
iii) Let cube c1 = pa(Fj(x) ∧ T (x, x′) ∧Bk′(x′))|x (From 3(b)i c1 must exist);
iv) Set Bk+1 := Bk+1 ∪ {c1} if Bk+1 exists, otherwise set Bk+1 := {c1};
v) Let φ = Fj−1(x) ∧ T (x, x′) ∧ c1′(x′);
vi) If φ is satisfiable, let c2 = pa(φ)|x then assert c2 6⊆ R−1(S(B)) and set Bk+2 := Bk+2 ∪ {c2} if Bk+2 exists,
otherwise set Bk+2 := {c2};
vii) If φ is unsatisfiable, let c2 = muc(φ)|c1′ then assert ¬c2 6⊇ Fj and set Fj := Fj ∪ {¬c2}.
c) If ∃0 ≤ j ≤ i · Fj ⊆
⋃
0≤m≤j−1 Fm, return safe;
d) Set i = i+ 1;
the termination of Step 3b.
Lemma 3: Step 3b in the framework will finally terminate.
Proof: Assume that S(F )∩R−1(S(B)) = ∅ never holds,
and j > 0 in the framework is always true. So there is
always a formula φ = Fj−1(x) ∧ T (x, x′) ∧ c1(x′) such that
the F - or B-sequence can be updated (see Step 3(b)vi and
3(b)vii). Moreover, Lemma 2 guarantees that the size of each
Fi decreases strictly while the size of R−1(S(B)) increases
strictly. However, since the sizes of Fis and R−1(S(B)) are
bounded, they cannot be updated forever. As a result, either
j = 0 must be finally true, or S(F )∩R−1(S(B)) = ∅ finally
holds.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 3.
Proof: First of all, if the framework returns, Lemma 1
guarantees the F - and B- sequences are preserved under the
framework. Hence, the correctness is guaranteed by Theorem
2 and Theorem 1.
Now we prove the framework will finally return. First
Theorem 3 guarantees the while loop in the framework can
always terminate, with unsafe or S(F ) ∩ R−1(S(B)) = ∅
is true. As a result, the loop body on each i can finally
terminate. Now we prove the loop on i can also terminate.
If Sys is unsafe for P with a counterexample of length of
greater than one, the framework will return finally according
to Item 3(b)ii. It is because the size of S(B) is bounded, so
the size of R−1(S(B)) is also bounded. Moreover, Lemma
2 guarantees the size of R−1(S(B)) keeps growing in each
i, thus R−1(S(B)) will finally contain all reachable states to
¬P for some i ≥ 0, which will include an initial state in
I = F0. On the other hand, if Sys is safe for P , since S(F )
is also bounded, and Lemma 2 guarantees the size of each
Fj keeps decreasing, so S(F ) will finally contain only the
set of reachable states from I for some i. At that time, our
framework will return according to Item 3c based on Theorem
1.
C. Related Work
There are two main differences between CAR and IC3/PDR.
First, IC3/PDR requires the F -sequence to be monotone,
while CAR does not. Because CAR keeps the F -sequence
non-monotone, it does not require the push and propagate
processes, which are necessary in IC3/PDR. A drawback for
CAR is that additional SAT calls are needed to check safety,
i.e. to find i > 0 such that Fi+1 ⊆
⋃
0≤j≤i Fj holds. In
IC3/PDR, since the F -sequence is monotone, it is easy to find
such i that Fi = Fi+1 syntactically.
Another main difference between CAR and IC3/PDR is
the way they refine the F -sequence. CAR utilizes the off-
the-shelf MUC techniques, while IC3/PDR puts more efforts
to compute MIC such that the refined F -sequence is still
monotone. Moreover, MIC are relatively inductive, while
clauses from MUC cannot guarantee. As a result, CAR and
IC3/PDR refines the F -sequence by different kinds of clauses,
and thus perform differently. Although computing relatively-
inductive clauses is proved to be efficient in IC3/PDR, we
show in the experiments that, CAR complements IC3/PDR on
the instances that computing relatively inductive clauses is not
conducive for efficient checking.
It is trivial to apply the framework of CAR in both forward
and backward directions by simply reversing the direction
of the model. Indeed, our implementation of CAR runs the
forward and backward modes in parallel. Although in theory
it is also possible to run IC3/PDR in backward mode, there
is a technical issue that must be addressed. In most IC3/PDR
implementations, the initial states I is considered as a single
cube. This helps to save a lot of SAT calls in the process of
generalization, in which the computed clause c must satisfy
I ∧ c is unsatisfiable. (When I is a cube it is reduced to
checking the containment of ¬c ⊆ I .) But usually the set
of unsafe states cannot be expressed by a single cube, which
makes it more complex to run IC3/PDR in a backward mode.
Indeed, the evaluation of IC3/PDR in the backward mode is
still an open topic.
CAR also maintains an under-approximate state sequence
(B-sequence) to check unsafety, while IC3/PDR checks un-
safety “on-the-fly”. Other papers also introduced multiple
state sequences. The approach of “Dual Approximated Reach-
ability” maintains two over-approximate state sequences to
check safety in both forward and backward directions [13]. In
contrast, we maintain two complementary (over- and under-)
approximate state sequences to check safety and unsafety at
the same time. In [14], states reachable from initial states are
maintained to help to handle proof-obligation generation. In
contrast, the B-sequence keeps states that reach bad states.
In PD-KIND [15], the idea of keeping both over- and under-
approximate (F- and B-) state sequences is also introduced,
and the B-sequence is used to refine the F-sequence as well.
However, CAR utilizes the F-sequence for safety checking
and B-squence for unsafey checking, while PD-KIND utilizes
the F-sequence for unsafety checking and another “induction
frame” has to be introduced for the safety checking. Moreover,
CAR and PD-KIND use very different underlying techniques:
CAR uses MUC and partial assignment, while PD-KIND uses
interpolation and generalization.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
Experimental Setup In this section, we report the re-
sults of the empirical evaluation. Our (C++) model checker
CARchecker1 runs CAR in both Forward and Backward
modes, using Minisat [16] and Muser2 [10] as the SAT and
MUC engines. The tool implements the algorithm from [11] to
extract partial assignments. The performance of CARchecker
is tested by evaluating it on the 548 safety benchmarks from
the 2015 Hardware-Model-Checking Competition [3].
We first compared the performance of CAR with that
of IC3/PDR, as implemented in the state-of-the-art model
checker ABC [9] (the “pdr” command in ABC with default
parameters). It should be noted that, there are many variants of
IC3/PDR implementations currently, in which many heuristics
are applied to the original one [17]. We choose ABC as
the reference implementation for comparison because it is a
standard model checker integrating several kinds of SAT-based
model checking techniques. Moreover, a portfolio of modern
model checkers consists of IC3/PDR, BMC (Bounded Model
Checking), and IMC (Interpolation Model Checking), so we
also run the experiments of BMC and IMC in ABC to explore
the contribution of CAR compared to an existing portfolio (we
used the “bmc2” and “int” commands in ABC with default
parameters).
We run the experiments on a compute cluster that consists
of 2304 processor cores in 192 nodes (12 processor cores per
node), running at 2.83 GHz with 48GB of RAM per node. The
operating system on the cluster is RedHat 6.0. When we run
the experiments, each tool is run on a dedicated node, which
guarantees that no CPU or memory conflict with other jobs
will occur. Our tool CARchecker can run CAR in Forward
mode, Backward mode or combined mode, which returns the
best result from either of the approaches. In our experiments,
memory limit was set to 8 GB and time limit (CPU time) to
1 hour. Instances that cannot be solved within this time limit
are considered unsolved, and the corresponding time cost is
set to be 1 hour. We compare the model-checking results from
1 https://github.com/lijwen2748/CARchecker
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Fig. 1: Overall performance among different approaches.
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Fig. 2: Overall performance on checking unsafe models.
CARchecker with those from ABC on all benchmarks, and no
discrepancy is found.
Experimental Results We show first overall performance
comparison among different approaches in Fig. 1. Neither
Forward CAR nor Backward CAR by itself is currently
competitive with IC3/PDR. The reasons are as follows. First,
the implementation of CARchecker does not utilize the power
of incremental SAT computing, since the clauses to be added
to the SAT solver are from the output of MUC solvers; We do
not know of a way to combine them incrementally. In contrast,
incremental SAT calling is an important feature in IC3/PDR.
Secondly, ABC is a mature tool, incorporating many heuristics,
while CARchecker has only been in development for a few
months so it is not be surprising that ABC performs better. We
believe that the performance of CARchecker can be improved
in the future.
Nevertheless, CAR is able to compete with IC3/PDR when
combining the Forward and Backward modes. In Fig. 1, the
plotted line for “Combined CAR” is obtained from the best
results which selected from either Forward or Backward CAR:
Combined CAR solves a total number of 288 instances, while
IC3/PDR solves a total number of 271 instances. Moreover,
42 instances are solved only by Combined CAR. We view the
advantage of running CAR in both directions as one of the
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Fig. 3: Overall performance on checking safe models.
contributions of this paper; it remains to be seen whether this
would also be an advantage for IC3/PDR.
A major point we wish to demonstrate in this section,
is that Forward CAR complements IC3/PDR. In Fig. 1, the
plotted line for “Forward CAR + IC3/PDR” shows the best
results from Forward CAR and IC3/PDR. This combination
outperforms IC3/PDR by solving 21 more instances. These
21 instances are solved by Forward CAR on checking safe
models, see the results in Fig 3. In contrast, in Fig. 2 we see
that the portfolio of Forward CAR combined with IC3/PDR
does not win more instances than IC3/PDR on checking unsafe
models (the two lines are plotted together), while in Fig. 3 the
improvement is obvious.
As a concrete example, consider a real instance “6s24.aig”
in the benchmark, which is solved quickly by Forward CAR
but times out by IC3/PDR. Forward CAR adds the clause
{2956} (2956 is an input id in the model) into F∞ in Frame
1 because the cube {¬2956} is detected to represent a set of
dead states. Moreover, it also detects the clause {¬2956} must
be added to F1, as the states represented by the cube {2956}
are one step unreachable from I . As a result, Forward CAR
quickly decides in Frame 1 that this model is safe, because
both clauses {2956} and {¬2956} cannot meet in F1 (recall
that F∞ ⊆ F1). For IC3/PDR, although it can detect that the
clause {2956} should be added to F∞, it cannot add the clause
{¬2956} into F1, because it is not a relatively inductive clause,
i.e. F1(x) ∧ T (x, x′) ∧ (¬2956)(x) ⇒ (¬2956)′(x′) is not
true. As a result, computing relatively-inductive clauses is less
conductive than computing non-relatively-inductive clauses to
check this benchmark. So Forward CAR is able to complement
IC3/PDR in such similar instances.
Furthermore, if we consider important parameters that influ-
ence the performance, e.g., number of clauses and number of
frames, we get more positive results. Note that comparing the
number of SAT calls between Forward CAR and PDR is not
too informative, since Forward CAR also contains MUC calls.
So fewer SAT calls in Forward CAR does not mean lower cost.
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 shows respectively the scatter plots between
Forward CAR and IC3/PDR on number of clauses and number
of frames. From the figures, Forward CAR does not generate
more clauses or more frames than IC3/PDR. In detail, 172
(175) instances are solved with fewer clauses (frames) by
Forward CAR than IC3/PDR, comparing with that 121 (118)
instances are solved with fewer clauses (frames) by IC3/PDR
than Forward CAR. Generally speaking, the number of clauses
and frames are positively correlated to the overall performance,
which indicates that Forward CAR should be competitive with
IC3/PDR, once CARchecker is as optimized as ABC.
Backward CAR complements both Forward CAR and IC3/
PDR on unsafe models. As shown in Fig. 2, Backward CAR
solves more unsafe cases (80) than IC3/PDR (72) and Forward
CAR (51). Moreover, the combination of the three approaches
solves 17 more unsafe cases than Forward CAR and IC3/PDR.
It is surprising to see that the performance of Forward CAR
is much worse than that of Backward CAR (51 vs 80),
and all solved cases by Forward CAR are also solved by
Backward CAR. Forward CAR searches from bad states (¬P )
and the goal states are in I , while Backward CAR searches
from I and the goal states are in ¬P . A conjecture is that
the state space of ¬P is much larger than that of I , thus
causing the overapproximate search to the states in ¬P to
be easier. Although Backward CAR solves more unsafe cases
than IC3/PDR, there are several cases that can be solved by
IC3/PDR but cannot be solved by Backward CAR. We leave
further comparison between IC3/PDR and Backward CAR to
future work.
Finally, we explore the contribution of CAR to the current
SAT-based model-checking portfolio, which includes BMC,
IMC and IC3/PDR. Fig. 1 shows the plots on the combinations
IC3/PDR+BMC+IMC, IC3/PDR+BMC+IMC+Forward CAR,
and IC3/PDR+BMC+IMC+Combined CAR. Forward CAR
adds 19 solved instances (all safe models) to the combination
of IC3/PDR+BMC+IMC, and Backward CAR solves another
two (1 safe and 1 unsafe model). Although BMC solves
the most unsafe cases (116), there are three unsafe instances
solved only by IC3/PDR and one unsafe instance solved
only by Backward CAR. For safe models, the number of
solved instances only by IC3/PDR, IMC, Forward CAR and
Backward CAR are 13, 12, 19, 1, respectively.
In summary, we conclude from our experimental results
that 1) Forward CAR complements IC3/PDR on checking
safe models; 2) Backward CAR complements IC3/PDR on
checking unsafe models; 3) Running CAR in both directions
improves the performance, and 4) CAR contributes to the
current portfolio of model checking strategies. We expect
these conclusions to be strengthened as the development of
CARchecker matures.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
CAR is inspired by IC3/PDR, but it differs from it in some
crucial aspects. A main difference between CAR and IC3/PDR
is that CAR does not require the F -sequence to be monotone.
Also CAR uses a different strategy (MUC) to refine the F -
sequence than IC3/PDR. Furthermore, CAR combines its over-
approximate and under-approximate searches in both forward
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and backward modes. Due to these differences, CAR and
IC3/PDR have different performance profiles. Our experiments
show that IC3/PDR and CAR complement each other. The
fact that our new tool, after a few months of development,
outperforms mature tools that have been under development
for many years over a non-negligible fraction of the benchmark
suite, speaks to the merit of the new approach.
Furthermore, the area of SAT-based model checking is still
a very active research topic. Many improvements to IC3/PDR
have been proposed since the first published paper [7]. For
example, a recent development is the combination of IC3/PDR
with IMC in the Avy tool [18]. We believe that beyond the
CAR tool, the CAR framework is an important contribution
to this research area and will stimulate further research. For
example, it may be easier to combine IMC with CAR than
to combine IMC with IC3/PDR, as currently Avy has to pay
extra effort to convert the generated interpolation invariants to
be monotone, meeting the requirement to the state sequence
maintained by IC3/PDR, while CAR does away with this
monotonicity requirement.
To conclude, we presented here Complementary Approxi-
mate Reachability (CAR), a new framework for SAT-based
safety model checking. CAR checks at the same time for both
safety and unsafety in a more general way than IC3/PDR, and
uses a different technique to refine the over-approximate state
sequence. Experiments show that CAR complements IC3/PDR
and contributes to the current portfolio, which consists of
IC3/PDR, BMC and IMC. We argue therefore CAR is a
promising approach for safety model checking.
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